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POLICY BRIEF
Accurate knowledge of maritime activities is vital for maritime security and the development of 
the blue economy. Although international donors have provided significant assistance, there are 
still no reliable regional maritime domain awareness structures in the Western Indian Ocean. This 
policy brief reviews current activities to identify opportunities through low-tech solutions, human 
resources and collaboration for improvement of maritime domain awareness in the region.
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Accurate and consistent knowledge of maritime activities is vital for maritime 
security. Knowledge of what happens at sea, whether it is criminal activity or 
not, and an understanding of maritime patterns of life are essential to identify 
and prevent threats and to inform operations and policies. This collective 
knowledge is known as Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and is one of the 
pre-conditions for effective maritime governance.1  
High-quality intelligence is the backbone of law enforcement at sea, given 
the vast amount of space that must be covered through limited capacities. 
Efficient flow of information allows for more rapid responses to incidents, 
such as piracy or marine emergencies. A solid knowledge of the maritime 
sphere is also important for the coordination of activities among different 
governmental agencies and regional and international actors, as well as 
between governments and the marine industry. 
The importance of MDA has been widely acknowledged. The African 
Union’s 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy emphasises the need 
to develop shared structures and argues that MDA is ‘a critical enabler 
in building Africa’s maritime domain security and safety.’2  Consequently, 
the development of MDA capabilities is one of the top priorities of African 
capacity building projects in the maritime domain. 
Regional focus: Western Indian Ocean
In the Western Indian Ocean region, maritime security has become a 
particularly pressing concern. The majority of MDA functions in this region are 
not provided by African or regional actors, but rather by international actors 
like the European Union’s Naval Force Atalanta (EUNAVFOR Atalanta). Multi-
lateral naval missions sent to the region respond to Somali-based piracy, 
conduct surveillance of regional waters, handle communications between 
law enforcement agencies and shipping traffic and coordinate responses to 
incidents or threats. For the region to become independent from international 
navies, significant efforts are underway to develop regionally owned and 
operated structures. 
The majority of this capacity-building work is organised in the framework of 
two internationally-funded regional projects. The first is the Djibouti Code of 
Conduct process – a regional agreement for training and information sharing 
initiated and supported by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and 
the EU’s Critical Maritime Routes Indian Ocean (CRIMARIO) project. This 
process began in 2009 and has led to the establishment of three information-
sharing centres. The second is the Programme to Promote Regional 
Maritime Security (MASE), which was established in 2013. Funded by the EU, 
MASE will soon launch two centres for information-sharing and operational 
coordination under the leadership of the Indian Ocean Commission. 
  Maritime domain awareness 
(MDA), the effective 
understanding of maritime 
activities, is vital for maritime 
security. Despite the efforts of 
regional projects, such as the 
Djibouti Code of Conduct and the 
Programme to Promote Regional 
Maritime Security (MASE), the 
Western Indian Ocean remains 
dependent on international 
navies for reliable MDA.
  New priorities for regional MDA 
centres are required to ensure 
trust and reliability. Emphasis 
should be placed on low-
tech solutions including the 
systematic collection of publicly 
available information and the 
gathering of human intelligence. 
National MDA structures must 
also be enhanced.
  It remains unclear how 
regional initiatives relate to 
each other and can form a 
regional system. Also, areas of 
collaboration between maritime 
security and the blue economy 
need to be realised. 
Key points
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enforcement at sea, given the vast amount of space 
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The main objective of both projects is the development of an effective MDA 
structure for the region, one that can operate independently from international 
navies and perform core information-sharing functions and coordinate maritime 
security operations. Unfortunately, the achievements of these two projects so 
far have remained limited. In 2017, the region is far away from having its own 
independent MDA structure. The existing centres should enable the sharing of 
information, conduct research and analysis of maritime developments, provide 
a shared maritime situational picture and coordinate operations. Thus far, 
however, they have not provided any of these functions. Indeed, the centres 
have not been very active nor have they promoted a clear idea of how they will 
provide MDA. They are hampered by a lack of trust and confidence and there 
is no willingness to share information with the centres.3  
This notable lack of progress begs the question: what can be done to 
improve developments in regional MDA in the Western Indian Ocean? 
This policy brief begins with an evaluation of the situation of MDA in the 
Figure 1: Map of the Western Indian Ocean
Source: https://freevectormaps.com
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region and the two major regional projects. Based on 
this discussion, four guiding principles for strategic 
direction are outlined: 1) Capacity building should 
focus on low-tech, not high-tech solutions, and there 
should be greater emphasis on collating public sources 
and working with coastal populations; 2) National and 
regional capacities need to be developed together; 
3) Community-building efforts should be intensified; and 
4) Relationships between regional organisations and 
projects require political clarification, in particular, there 
must be greater collaboration between maritime security-
oriented projects and those that are development- or 
environment-oriented.
The state of affairs
From 2008, piracy activities in the Western Indian 
Ocean were on the rise. The improvement of 
information gathering and sharing of data on piracy 
incidents, therefore, has become essential for a 
coordinated response.4  To complement the work 
done by the IMO and the International Maritime Bureau 
on piracy since the 1970s,5  international actors have 
developed dedicated MDA capacities in the region. For 
example the multilateral mission EUNAVFOR Atalanta, 
its Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHoA), 
and the US-led Combined Maritime Forces conduct 
vital surveillance of the Western Indian Ocean.6 They 
collect intelligence for law enforcement operations, in 
particular to trigger rapid responses to piracy incidents 
and to inform policymakers on threats and trends in the 
region. As of 2017 these were still the core systems in 
the region. 
MSCHoA is the backbone of the MDA system in the 
region. Following the Best Management Practices for 
Protection against Somalia Based Piracy – the core 
international guidance document for the shipping 
industry – shipping vessels transiting the region must 
register with the centre.7 The picture of maritime 
merchant traffic in the area gathered by MSCHoA 
informs naval operations and is particularly important 
to ensure rapid responses to incidents. MSCHoA’s 
information sharing tool, Mercury, provides a technical 
mechanism for the region to share incident data rapidly 
as well as to coordinate operations between the 
different actors in the region. The work of the centre is 
widely hailed as one of the key factors in successfully 
containing piracy since 2012.8  
With the decline in reported piracy incidents, the need 
for a transition strategy became increasingly pertinent.9 
The absence of an immediate piracy threat led to the 
declining interest of international actors in maintaining 
their levels of engagement, instead considering long-term 
objectives in the region. As a result, the new objective 
was to empower regional actors through capacity-
building to take over MDA functions. Regionalising 
counter-piracy responses became a top political priority 
in forums such as the Contact Group on Piracy off the 
Coast of Somalia (CGPCS).10 Significant efforts are also 
underway to develop regionally owned MDA structures. 
The Djibouti Code of Conduct
The Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) process, initiated 
and supported by the IMO and the EU’s CRIMARIO 
project, was established to develop just such a maritime 
security arrangement. There are three Information 
Sharing Centres (ISCs) in Sana’a (Yemen), Mombasa 
(Kenya) and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), with the Sana’a 
centre as the overarching regional centre. By 2012, 21 
coastal countries from Southern and Eastern Africa, the 
Red Sea and the Arab Peninsula had signed the code. 
In January 2017, an amendment broadened its focus to 
maritime crimes beyond piracy.11 
Under the DCoC, each participating state has 
identified an institution and individual as a focal 
point.12 The vision is that, through such a system of 
national focal points, information on piracy incidents 
or suspicious activities can be quickly disseminated. 
This information can then be analysed on national and 
regional levels to enhance transnational responses and 
further strategic development. The first phase of DCoC 
was supported by a dedicated project implementation 
unit at the IMO and by the Enhancing Maritime 
Security and Safety through Information Sharing and 
Capacity Building (MARSIC) project funded by the 
EU’s Critical Maritime Routes programme. MARSIC 
was replaced in 2015 by the project CRIMARIO, which 
is today the core international capacity building project 
supporting the DCoC.13
The three ISCs are operative mainly in principle and have 
not achieved much visibility or produced outcomes. 
With the decline in reported piracy 
incidents, the need for a transition 
strategy became increasingly pertinent
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The centres mainly maintain the focal point network through routine calls 
and the Yemeni centre sends out a weekly report to stakeholders, which 
draws on data provided by EUNAVFOR. The primary function of DCoC is as 
a framework for training in the Djibouti Regional Training Centre, provided by 
the IMO, CRIMARIO and other states and organisations. 
The MASE project
The second major MDA project is the Programme to Promote Regional 
Maritime Security (MASE). MASE is a EU-funded project that launched in 2013. 
The project is implemented by four regional organisations14 with support from 
international agencies15 on the basis of a strategy agreed on in 2010.16 MASE 
also has a network of national focal points, which meets regularly. 
MASE has five pillars, two of which are relevant for the provision of MDA: 
pillar four focuses on enhancing national and regional capacity for maritime 
tasks and pillar five on the development of a regional mechanism for 
coordination and exchange of information. As part of this work two centres 
will be developed; a centre for regional information exchange will be based in 
Madagascar and a centre for the coordination of operations will be based in 
the Seychelles.17 Although the centres are expected to launch in 2017, it will 
take time for them to become fully operational.18
Given this situation, the region is clearly not yet ready to provide MDA or to 
take over major functions from international actors and it will take time to 
develop the structures necessary for these shifts to occur. Though the DCoC 
process has been running since 2009 and MASE was initiated in 2010 and 
has been active since 2013, there has been little progress in developing 
reliable regional MDA. The next step is to review opportunities for improved 
work focus and priorities.
Favour low-tech over high-tech solutions
The purpose of MDA is gaining an understanding of what happens at 
sea and gathering a shared picture of maritime activity within and among 
countries. Most MDA discussions have focussed on technological solutions, 
in particular, advanced surveillance technology and big data analysis.19 
Developing shared understandings of maritime activity does not necessarily 
imply using advanced technology; even resource-rich Western countries 
struggle with how to surveil maritime space in real-time.20 Thus the starting 
point for a regionally owned MDA structure cannot be to rely on the same 
high-tech systems developed elsewhere. Systems that have been tested 
in the region, such as the web-based fusing and visualisation system 
Piracy, Maritime Awareness and Risk (PMAR) developed by the EU21, are 
highly expensive and overly complex. While a basic understanding of MDA 
technology is important and training is required, a productive starting point 
lies in low-tech systems. The work of the two Southeast Asian MDA centers 
ReCAAP and IFC provides important lessons here.22
ReCAAP has gained visibility through its analytical reports and guidelines, not 
through its ability to provide a real time picture of the maritime domain. While 
Yemen, Kenya 
and Tanzania
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the IFC relies on sophisticated technology (thanks to the resources of the 
Singapore government), it has also gained recognition as a valuable source 
of information through its weekly summary of events and incidents. These 
reports rely entirely on open sources. The five regional centres in the Western 
Indian Ocean, created under the DCoC and MASE programmes, should 
adopt similiar approaches used by ReCAAP and IFC. 
By providing regular (ideally weekly) reports on activities in regional waters, 
the centres can build their reputation as added-value institutions. Through 
their network of national focal points, they can verify media reports and 
quickly become reliable sources of information. Over time, they will become 
recognised as knowledge providers and can inform risk evaluations for the 
shipping industry. Building this reputation will increase trustworthiness and 
the centres will become recognised as reliable partners.
Installing sophisticated and complicated technology is not the best route to 
gain trust. Simple measures, rather, should be taken. For example, collating 
public incident data and running simple statistics provides information that 
could be turned into quarterly research reports on trends in the region. The 
low-tech practice of collecting media reports, verifying them through focal 
points, publishing them in a weekly newsletter, recording data and offering 
commented statistics in quarterly reports would make a major difference for 
the region and would provide valuable information for policy development in 
coastal countries and for the work of international actors. 
Work with human sources
Another low-tech solution for MDA is to better consider the importance 
of people as a source of intelligence for MDA. The observations and 
experiences of coastal populations are invaluable sources of information that 
can be gathered at relatively low costs. The approach taken by the Joint 
Maritime Information Coordination Centre (JMICC), operated by Pakistan’s 
navy, provides valuable lessons learned from this experience.23 In contrast to 
other technology-oriented centres, JMICC is based on human information. 
It works with a wide range of stakeholders – both state and non-state 
organisations – that provide the JMICC with information; it also runs a coastal 
engagement programme. Staff of JMICC regularly visit coastal regions and 
engage in dialogue with village elders and fisher folk. 
Through this direct engagement, the JMICC receives first-hand observations 
on coastal developments and has become recognised as the first point of 
contact for reporting maritime incidents and suspicious activities. This has 
shown that working directly with coastal populations is a valuable starting 
point for MDA centres and that human-sourced information can provide a 
solid basis for delivering analysis and reports.  
Through their network of national focal points, centres 
can verify media reports and quickly become reliable 
sources of information
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Develop national capacities along with 
regional ones
A major challenge of regional information sharing in the 
Western Indian Ocean is that national capacities are 
equally weak. At its core, regional information sharing 
does not work without information to disseminate. While 
relying on public sources and information collected from 
coastal populations provides an initial remedy, regional 
MDA will only work if national structures are improved. 
Both DCoC and MASE address MDA on a regional level. 
The underlying idea is that regional structures can be 
more cost-effective and mutually beneficial for coastal 
countries without harming anyone’s particularistic interests. 
Regional cooperation is also essential when addressing 
the wide range of trans-border maritime crimes, which is 
often why international donors prefer regional over national 
investments. National structures, nonetheless, are equally 
important especially for law enforcement capacities. 
Capacity building projects must find the right balance 
between national and regional requirements.
With the January 2017 amendments, the DCoC countries 
have already made a step in this direction.24 One of the 
priority areas in the agreement is building national capacities 
that feed into regional projects. The MASE project would 
also benefit from more attention to national needs. In the 
long term countries will need to determine when and how 
to pool resources and work on a regional level and when to 
work on a national, bilateral or trilateral level.  
Continue to build professional regional 
networks
If there is one area where international capacity building 
projects succeed, it is the emphasis they put on building 
networks and communities of regional maritime security 
professionals. These have the potential to develop strong 
inter-personal relationships in the region. Although the 
impact of such communities is often long-term and 
difficult to measure, they are crucial for the success of 
regional institutional structures. 
Studies on regional integration have shown the value of 
inter-personal relationships between people and officials 
on different professional levels.25 The trainings delivered 
by CRIMARIO, the IMO and others provide skills and 
create intra-regional communities of maritime security 
professionals. These communities can further integration 
and establish environments where information is shared 
and maritime security agencies can collaborate. 
Clarify the relations between initiatives
Although the EU supports the MDA centres of MASE 
and DCoC, the relationship between the projects 
remains unclear. While MASE and CRIMARIO agreed 
on a strategic partnership in 2015, there is still a lack of 
clarity on how the five centres will work together. There is 
even overlap in membership; Kenya, the Seychelles and 
Mauritius, for instance, are participants in both structures. 
To avoid duplication and to ensure efficient investments, 
memoranda of understanding must be negotiated on 
opportunities for collaboration and clarification of activities 
between the centres. 
There are other organisations involved in developing 
regional MDA, especially the Indian Ocean Naval 
Symposium (IONS), the Indian Ocean Rim Association 
(IORA) and the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime 
(IOFMC). The IONS is a collaboration of navies from 
the Indian Ocean region.26 The majority of the MASE 
and DCoC countries are members of IONS. One of its 
working groups explicitly deals with establishing effective 
information sharing through developing standard 
operating procedures and a Maritime Information 
Exchange Directory.27 
The IORA is a regional integration mechanism that in the 
past has primarily focused on economic integration.28 
IORA is a cross-regional organisation and one of the focal 
areas of IORA is maritime security and safety. Within 
this area, IORA focuses on the ‘exchange of information, 
capacity building and the provision of technical 
assistance’ and intends to establish ‘a regular forum for 
dialogue between stakeholders on security and safety.’29 
While IONS and IORA are organisations driven and led 
by regional countries, the IOFMC is an informal technical 
collaboration mechanism organised and implemented by 
the Global Maritime Crime Programme of the UN Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).30 The objective of IOFMC 
is to enhance the collaboration between law enforcement 
officials in the region and to ‘promote a shared 
understanding of the maritime crimes’ in the region.31 
These three organisations are important because 
they include regional countries that are neither part 
A major challenge of regional information 
sharing in the Western Indian Ocean is 
that national capacities are equally weak
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of DCoC nor MASE. This includes India, Iran and Pakistan, countries 
with significant naval capabilities and operational experiences. Clarifying 
relationships will strengthen the regional MDA environment and reduce 
competition and complexity.
Identify areas for collaboration between maritime security 
and the blue economy
Although many projects are informed by maritime security concerns, 
significant work in maritime governance is also conducted in the frame of 
sustainable development, with economic and environmental concerns. Work 
under the header of blue economy, such as projects for the protection of the 
marine environment, or with artisanal fishing communities, often tends not to 
be seen as linked to maritime security and the MDA discussion.32 Although 
a range of commentators, especially the African Union, has persistently 
emphasised the connection between maritime security and the blue 
economy, these tend to be treated as separate agendas.33 
Tackling maritime insecurities, protecting the marine environment, and 
sustainably harvesting ocean resources are all dependent on effective 
understandings of what happens in the maritime domain.34 For example, 
surveys on marine life and fishing patterns conducted by environmental 
agencies can inform a shared picture of the maritime domain and assist in the 
detection of anomalies. 
The promotion of MDA can be built into development projects. Coastal 
communities and environmental agencies can thus be informed about the 
benefits of collaborating with MDA centres. In the field of fishery regulation, 
for example, there is overlap and common interest in maritime activity, 
especially given that fishery crime is a security, environmental and economic 
issue.35 Strengthening the collaboration between security, development and 
environmental professionals has a high potential for improving MDA in the region. 
Conclusion: take pragmatic steps and continue to invest
Building efficient and sustainable MDA structures, creating institutions and 
centres that are trusted and enhance coordination, and continuing training 
and other capacity building measures will decrease the dependency of the 
region on international actors. This in turn is key to ensure that maritime 
security and development of the blue economy is locally driven and owned. 
These are not short-term goals. Long-term efforts and conversations about 
next steps are necessary. Not high-tech solutions, but pragmatic steps and 
creative solutions, are required.
The international community will have to continue to invest in regional structures, 
but, as this policy brief has argued, should carefully plan the priorities that are 
pursued. This will require greater investment in people and analytical capacities, 
as well as a re-think about which technologies are required and are appropriate 
in local contexts. Given overall resource constraints, as well as the declining 
strategic interest of some international partners, more attention needs to be 
paid to orchestrating the various initiatives and programmes in order to develop 
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